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Abstract
The COVID-19 pandemic presented an array of policy problems for school districts across the country.
This included balancing social distancing during in-person learning. The creation of the COVID-19 vaccine made
in-person learning a more viable option again. However, the political polarization that surrounded COVID-19
extended to vaccines, with many communities experiencing hurdles in vaccinating their populace. Previous
research shows how teachers’ unions influenced school district reopenings during the height of the pandemic in
fall of 2020; this paper seeks to expand on this literature by looking at how teachers’ unions influence the adoption
of vaccination mandates and testing. I test whether a school district has a collective bargaining agreement (CBA)
with a teachers’ union, the page length of that CBA. Using an OLS regression, I find that if a teachers’ union has
a CBA with its school district, the district is 33% more likely to adopt a vaccination and testing mandate than a
district without a CBA. Additionally, the page length CBA has a weaker, but still significant relationship in
encouraging the adoption of a vaccination and testing mandate in a school district.
Keywords: Teachers’ unions, COVID-19, vaccination mandates, collective bargaining
As COVID-19 began spreading through the
United States in March of 2020, state governments
across the country declared states of emergencies and
shut down their states. Figuring out how to safely
continue education in school districts became a large
policy concern as children’s learning was disrupted.
Online learning became the dominant form of learning
for students. However, online learning encountered
many problems. Besides the difficulties in acquiring
technology to sustain online learning like internet
connection and laptops, evidence suggests that online
learning was not as effective as learning in person,
especially for younger students (Tomasik et al., 2021).
When the school year in the fall of 2020 began,
involved parties, such as school districts, unions, state
and local governments, assessed the costs and benefits
of returning to in-person learning. The politically
polarized narratives regarding COVID-19 made the
discussions on how to approach the 2020-2021 school

year difficult. Groups had to be organized and possess
the power to achieve preferred outcomes. As the
vaccine against COVID-19 came into play, this opened
up new discussions on how to fight the pandemic and
protect populations in schools.
In this paper, I examine how teachers’ unions
influence the adoption of COVID-19 vaccination
mandates in their school districts. I leverage my own
dataset of 49 school districts and their collective
bargaining agreements (CBAs) against the vaccination
policies that the school districts adopt. I find that a
district with a CBA is 33% more likely to adopt a
vaccination and test mandate, and that there is some
support for the argument that the more pages in a CBA,
the more likely the school district will adopt a
vaccination and testing mandate. These findings add to
the discussion of how teachers’ unions have influenced
school district policies as it relates to the COVID-19
pandemic. This helps illuminate the potential roles that
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unions may play in the event of future public health
crises.
The paper is structured as follows. In the first
section I discuss the current events of how COVID-19
has affected the education system in the U.S. and the
literature that proceeded to explain how teachers’
unions influenced changing situations in school
districts. Then I provide an explanation for the
variables used in this study. In the second section, I
describe the collection of those variables in detail.
Next, section three covers the analysis of the collected
data. Lastly, I provide concluding remarks, and where
this research can be expanded upon.
Theories of Unions and how they respond to
COVID-19
COVID-19 and Unions
As states across the country shut down
economies and forced lockdowns onto their citizens,
school districts had to contend with teaching children
remotely. While federal funding supplied capital to
close many online infrastructure gaps (Jordan, 2021),
teaching in-person was still preferred due to online
learning not being as effective. However, there are still
costs associated with in-person learning. The main
costs were increased potential exposure to COVID-19,
the capital required to increase sanitary standards,
exacerbated staffing issues, and the lack of space to
maintain social distancing. Additionally, there were
chances of further disruption to learning by switching
from in-person back to online learning due to COVID19 outbreaks. The benefits, on the other hand, were that
students were likely to have better educational
outcomes under in-person learning, opportunities for
children to socialize, arguably less technological
issues, and it would reduce costs of parents caring for
their children at home to do other things like go to
work. In sum, there are several aspects to consider
when districts go back in-person. Teachers’ unions
play an important role here by representing teachers in
these discussions. Given that teachers bear a number of
these listed burdens and more, it is the union’s
responsibility to mitigate these burdens for its
members.
Unfortunately, there continue to be broader
political disagreements on how to balance a return to
pre-COVID-19 living while the disease still spreads
across the country. These debates impact the

discussions on reopening schools. The main point of
contention since the late summer and fall of 2020 is
whether we should adopt more restrictions to mitigate
the spread of the virus, such as mask mandates, social
distancing, and vaccination mandates, or if we should
limit or have no restrictions at all as a way to return to
pre-COVID-19 living. The politicization of the issue
was very public with then-President Trump pushing for
schools to reopen in the fall of 2020 despite experts
warning otherwise (Feuer, 2020). Partisanship
prevented policy solutions to stem the virus, with
Democrats being more “pro-restriction” than
Republicans who were more “anti-restriction”
(Grossman et al., 2021). Since policies to prevent
further COVID-19 spread were being stalled, teachers’
unions played a large role in getting such policies
passed. Many studies looked at union influence in
school districts and found that school districts with
stronger teachers’ unions were more likely to delay
teaching in-person (DeAngelis & Makridis, 2021;
Hartney & Finger, 2021; Marianno et al., 2021) or even
adopt mandates for school populations to wear masks
to prevent the spread of COVID-19 (Dean et al., 2021).
The primary way to return to a safe, in-person
learning environment is to have a substantial amount of
each school district’s community vaccinated against
COVID-19 because increased immunity stems the
impact and spread of the disease. The introduction of
the COVID-19 vaccines and their widespread access in
the spring of 2021 offered a chance to mitigate the
advancement of the disease across the country. Yet the
disagreements on vaccines and vaccination mandates
are a barrier to fighting COVID-19. Given the
influence that teachers’ unions had on the reopening of
schools during the 2020-2021 school year (Hemphill &
Marianno, 2021), it is pertinent to ask, how do
teachers’ unions influence the adoption of vaccination
mandates for employees in school districts? Do
teachers’ unions even have an incentive to support
employee vaccination mandates? The push for online
learning suggests they likely support the mandates.
Unions have a vested interest in keeping their members
safe. The lack of large vaccination rates endangers their
members. Thus, they should have a preference towards
some kind of incentive for school staff to get
vaccinated.
Unfortunately, the polarization around
vaccines presents an internal problem for unions. If

Spectra Undergraduate Research Journal – 2022 – Volume 2, Issue 1

48

TEACHER UNION INFLUENCE ON VACCINE MANDATES

there were to be a strict vaccine mandate and teachers
outright refused to get vaccinated, unions would lose
membership and school districts would lose teachers.
Therefore, unions and districts may be averse to a strict
vaccination mandate. Instead, the they may prefer a
vaccination and testing mandate. The difference
between strict vaccination mandates and vaccination
and testing mandates is that the vaccination and testing
mandate gives the teachers the option to avoid
vaccinations by taking periodic COVID-19 tests. This
is in contrast to the vaccination mandate which requires
all staff get vaccinated. Vaccination and testing
mandates still ensure some degree of safety for people
in schools by tracking COVID-19 cases that may
occur. Additionally, the vaccination and testing
mandate keeps pressure on teachers and staff to get
vaccines to avoid the costs associated with having to
get tested for COVID-19 and wait for results
periodically.
Theories of Group Power
Assuming unions prefer vaccination and testing
mandates, I am concerned with whether a union is able
to influence a school district to adopt a vaccination and
testing mandate. My research question is then: does the
strength of a teachers’ union predict whether a school
district will adopt a COVID-19 vaccination and testing
mandate? Measuring the strength of a teachers’ union
is necessary in this case. The strength of the teachers’
unions will be measured using Marianno et al.’s (2021)
methodology. Marianno et al. (2021) used Bachrach
and Baratz (1962) theory of interest group power and
found that unions with longer-term collective
bargaining, otherwise more entrenched power, were
more likely to delay in-person learning. Collective
bargaining agreements (CBAs) are contracts that
typically set salaries, class sizes, planning periods, and
spending levels (Hoxby, 1996; Rose & Sonstelie 2010;
Strunk, 2011). However, CBAs will likely have few or
no mentions of COVID-19 related policies because
these contracts can last several years. This is why
Marianno et al.’s (2021) use of Bachrach and Baratz’s
(1962) theory can be advantageous. Bachrach and
Baratz (1962) focused on the two faces of power that
were exercised by groups to influence others. There is
the short face of power and the long face of power. The
short face of power includes tactics that groups use
which are visible to the public. These tactics are in
reaction to proposed policies and hope to influence the

outcome of said policy. For example, when groups
make official statements to the press in regards to a
salient topic, this would be considered a use of the first
face of power. The long face of power, however, is a
deterrence tactic against unfavorable policies so that
the policies will not be put on agendas in the first place.
An example of the second face of power is when
groups use their connections with other important
groups or individuals outside the public sphere to
influence policies and agendas before those policies
and agendas are even set. In other words, groups
exercising the second face of power use their influence
amongst contained groups that have direct influence on
the outcome of policies. This is opposed to involving
the public in an effort to expand the conflict to the
groups benefit as the short face of power does. Due to
data limitations, I will not focus on the short face of
power. However, this is not too concerning since
Marianno et al. (2021) did not find statistical
significance for the short face of power in their paper.
In this analysis, I will utilize CBAs between
teachers’ unions and school districts for the long face
of power. CBAs serve as a good measure for the long
face of power because they show that the union has
bargaining capabilities with the school district and a
likelier chance of accomplishing its goals that would
be difficult without the CBA. To elaborate, unions with
CBAs could entrench their power within the school
districts by negotiating a contract with their districts.
Unions with CBAs have more leverage, and do not
need to expand their conflicts with school districts to
the public as much as a union without a CBA does.
With that, I also surmise that the longer a CBA, the
more likely that a school district would adopt a
vaccination and testing mandate. This is because a
CBA with more pages indicates more rights,
regulations, and other guarantees in favor of the
union—in other words, it indicates a stronger union.
Therefore, I am left with two hypotheses:
Hypothesis A: a school district that has a CBA with a
teachers’ union is more likely to adopt a vaccination
and testing mandate than a school district without a
CBA.
Hypothesis B: the more pages in a CBA between a
teacher’s union and a school district the more likely
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the school district will adopt a vaccination and testing
mandate.
Data
Independent Variables
To gather the data, I located the largest 50
school districts in the country from the National Center
for Education Statistics (2021). Then, I collected
unique data on union strength by looking at each school
district to see what teachers’ union the school districts
negotiated with and whether the union had a CBA. This
information is typically found in labor relation sections
of school district websites and, occasionally, within the
websites of teachers’ unions under negotiated contract
sections. Some states ban collective bargaining. Those
states being Texas, North Carolina, Tennessee, and
Georgia. Thus, school districts in these states were
documented as having no CBA. When I could not
locate a CBA in a school district, I contacted the school
district and/or the teachers union to see if they had a
CBA in place. If a school district was in the process of
negotiating a CBA and did not have one for the 20212022 school year but did have a CBA for the 20202021 school year, the older contract was used. This is
because previous research found that the length of
CBAs is relatively static over time (McDonnell &
Pascal, 1988; Cowen & Fowles, 2013; Ingle &
Wisman, 2017). Thus, using the older ones should not
be a problem for this study.
To measure the relative strength of teachers’
union CBAs, I then documented the number of pages
for the CBA by hand. I use this as one of the
independent variables to proxy the strength of a
teachers’ union in relation to Marianno et al. (2021)
that found a moderate negative relationship for the
number of pages in a CBA and the likelihood that a
school district will teach in person during the fall 2020
semester of the COVID-19 pandemic. The rationale
here is that the more pages there are in a CBA, the
power of a teachers’ union is broader and more
nuanced. Therefore, theoretically, a CBA with 426
pages would indicate that this teachers’ union would be
more powerful than a union with a 50-page CBA or one
without a CBA at all.
From this data, I created two independent
variables: the presence of a CBA and the number of
pages in the CBA. The first independent variable,
whether there were CBAs, is a binary variable coded as

a 1 being the presence of a CBA and a 0 being the
absence of a CBA. Figure 1 shows data about this
variable. The average of this variable is 0.571, meaning
that of the sampled districts, most had a collective
bargaining agreement.
Figure 1
Number of CBA Agreements

The second independent variable, the CBA
page numbers, is a ratio variable indicating the number
of pages in a CBA. The average pages in an agreement
are 82 pages with a range of 0 to 426 pages. This
information is displayed in Figure 2.
Figure 2
CBA Page Numbers

Dependent Variable
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To measure my dependent variable, I
investigated whether the school district had adopted a
vaccination and testing mandate. To elaborate, I
searched the internet whether school districts had the
option of requiring teachers to either receive a COVID19 vaccination or take periodic tests for COVID-19. I
used this rather than a COVID-19 vaccination-only
mandate because of the politically polarizing nature of
the COVID-19 vaccines. While teachers’ unions and
school districts want to preserve the health and safety
of staff and students, both groups want to retain
teachers. Giving teachers the option of not taking the
vaccine avoids some of the political backlash while
still incentivizing high vaccination rates. Protests have
been a common form of expression of disagreement
with these policies (McAndrew, 2021; Downey, 2021).
There were instances where school districts were not
allowed to adopt vaccination mandates because of state
law. Texas, for example, has many school districts that
were coded as not having vaccination and testing
mandates because of an executive order banning
COVID-19 vaccine mandates. The few school districts
that adopted a strict COVID-19 vaccination mandate
were still coded as having a vaccination and testing
mandate because it is essentially still the same effect in
both cases—incentivizing higher vaccination rates. As
an anecdote, this appears to be mostly exclusive to the
largest of school districts. Four of the largest five
school districts have a vaccination only mandate, with
one other school district in this sample outside of the
largest five school districts (Philadelphia City School
District, the 19th largest district in the country) to have
a vaccination only mandate. Figure 3 displays
information on the vaccination and testing mandates
variable. This binary variable is a 0 where there is no
vaccination and test mandate and a 1 where there is a
vaccination and testing mandate. With the average
being 0.428, Figure 3 indicates that most school
districts did not adopt a vaccination and testing
mandate.

Figure 3
Number of Vaccination and Testing Mandates

Analysis
Using two linear regression models, I find
support for both of my hypotheses. Table 1 describes
the relationship between the Vaccination and Tests
dependent variable and the CBA. Table 2 examines the
effect of CBA Page Numbers on school district policy.
Starting with Model 1, there is a moderately strong,
positive relationship when a teachers’ union has a CBA
with its school district and when a vaccination and test
mandate is in place in the school district. Specifically,
the presence of a CBA is statistically significant at the
0.05 level, with a coefficient of .333. Substantively,
this shows that a district that negotiated a CBA with a
union is 33% more likely to have a vaccination
mandate than a district without a CBA. Therefore,
hypothesis A has support, and I can reject the null
hypothesis.
Table 1
Model 1, Presence of CBA
Vaccination and tests
Presence of CBA
Constant
Observations

Coefficient Standard Error
0.3333**
0.1375
0.2381*** 0.104
49

Table 2
Model 2, CBA Page Numbers
Vaccination and tests
CBA Page Number
Constant
Observations

Coefficient Standard Error
0.001*
0.001
0.324***
0.09
49

Note: all models estimated using a linear regression.
*** p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .10
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Model 2 tests the second hypothesis. This
model, on the other hand, is only statistically
significant at the 0.10 level, with a coefficient of .001.
This means that for every 1 unit increase in the number
of pages in a CBA, there is a 1% greater probability
that a school district will adopt a vaccination mandate.
Regardless, the statistical significance means that I can
reject the null hypothesis at the 0.10 level. The results
are more interesting when one considers that some of
the school districts with CBAs that have a high page
count also have a strict vaccination mandate rather than
a vaccine and testing mandate. For example, New York
City Public Schools, Los Angeles Unified, and the City
of Chicago (SD 299) all have CBAs with 238 pages,
426 pages, and 381 pages, respectively, and strict
vaccination mandates. However, there are counter
points, like Clark County1 and Philadelphia City which
both have a strict vaccination mandate. Both have
CBAs under 100 pages but possess strict vaccine
mandates. Conversely, Dade County, the fourth largest
school district in the country, which also has a 274page CBA, does not have a strict vaccination mandate.
Further testing could be done to isolate whether there
is a threshold for page numbers that may predict the
adoption of a vaccination mandate.
Conclusion
Does the strength of a teachers’ union predict
whether a school district will adopt a COVID-19
vaccination mandate? In this paper, I argued yes.
Unions have a vested interest in keeping their members
safe. Their previous actions to delay school
reopoenings suggests that they would be in favor of
vaccination mandates. However, due to political
polarization surrounding vaccines and COVID-19, a
strict vaccination mandate may be unfeasible. So, I
posit that the combination of a vaccination and testing
mandate would be a better option to encourage better
vaccination rates against COVID-19.
To test my research question, I used the
presence and page length of collective bargaining
agreements (CBAs) for my independent variables to
measure teachers’ unions’ strength. This is similar to
how Marianno et al. (2021) conducted their study

based off of Bachrach and Baratz (1962) theory of
interest group power. CBAs are a useful application of
Bachrach and Baratz long face of power. CBAs are a
good representation of a union’s ability to negotiate
favorable policies relative to the school districts they
operate in. Union’s negotiating power allows them to
directly influence policies at the source of the policy
and does not require the public to be involved to
support the union’s endeavors. My first hypothesis
was, a school district that has a CBA with a teachers’
union is more likely to adopt a vaccine and testing
mandate than a school district without a CBA. I also
follow Marianno et al.’s (2021) methodology of using
the page numbers of a CBA to represent the strength of
the union. The more pages in the CBA indicates more
rights, regulations, and other guarantees in favor of the
union. My second hypothesis is the more pages in a
CBA between a teacher’s union and a school district
the more likely the school district will adopt a
vaccination mandate.
I find support for both of my hypotheses. A
school district that has a CBA with a teachers’ union is
33% more likely to adopt a vaccination and testing
mandate compared to a school district without a CBA.
The second hypothesis has weaker evidence, but the
findings are still statistically significant. For every 1
unit increase in the number of pages in a CBA, there is
a .001 higher chance that a school district will adopt a
vaccination and testing mandate. Substantively, this
has interesting applications for unions that have very
large CBAs with school districts. School districts like
New York City Public Schools, Los Angeles Unified,
and the City of Chicago (SD 299) have CBAs with 238
pages, 426 pages, and 381 pages, respectively, and all
have strict vaccination mandates compared to a
vaccination and testing mandates. This is not a rule of
thumb given that Philadelphia City School District and
Clark County School district also have vaccination
mandates and CBAs under 100 pages, or that Dade
County with a 274-page CBA does not have a strict
vaccination mandate. Regardless it is an interesting
observation and worthy of future study.
This study does have some limitations. I was
unable to account for some of the political polarization

1

Clark County’s vaccination mandate was just passed under a
vote by the school board and has yet to be implemented as of the
time this paper was written
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that may explain the adoption of vaccination and
testing mandates across the country. A number of
studies showed there were relationships between vote
shares for President Trump and the likelihood of
schools teaching in person in the fall of 2020. Trump
vote shares in school districts may also predict whether
or not school districts adopt vaccination and testing
mandates. This would be a good area for future study.
Another area for future study is employing Bachrach
and Baratz’s (1962) short face of power in addition to
the long face, to see if there would be different findings
from Marianno et al.
This paper adds to the literature of unions’
abilities to achieve policy goals, particularly in rapidly
changing and dynamic political environments. A great
deal of effort and power is required to alter policies that
had to be made with such short notice. Capturing how
unions reacted in the midst of a global pandemic is
important for future widespread emergencies and how
unions or other similar groups would react then. This
also adds to discussions about political polarization and
how it impacts policy measures meant to protect
people—in this case school populations. Especially in
contemporary politics, polarization can alter the policy
playing fields that actors work in. This paper gives
clues as to the entrenched powers that have advantages
in the face of rampant polarization.
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